Emerging economies (EMEs) exhibit high regulatory costs of firm creation. At the same time, lower firm-creation costs are associated with greater financial development and use of formal credit, which can expose EME firms to external financial shocks that propagate to EMEs via the banking system such as those that EMEs experienced during the Global Financial Crisis. We present evidence showing that in response to an adverse shock to the US banking system, EMEs with low firm-creation costs exhibit smaller contractions and earlier recoveries in cross-border bank flows, domestic bank credit, and GDP compared to EMEs with high firm-creation costs. A two-country model with banking frictions, cross-border bank flows, and endogenous firm entry can successfully capture this evidence. Our findings suggest that greater domestic credit-market deepening via lower barriers to firm entry in EMEs need not be associated with greater macro and domestic credit-market volatility.

This paper studies official sovereign debt empirically and theoretically. Official sovereign debt is more than half of the total sovereign debt in emerging markets and tends to flow in during default episodes. We develop a model with official and private debt where the sovereign can partially default on each of its debts. A fraction of the defaulted debt accumulates during a default episode, which resolves when the sovereign pays back its accrued obligations. Official debt is longer-term and more concessional during defaults than private debt, and the prices of all debts compensate lenders for default losses. The contractual differences across debts allow our model to rationalize the stylized facts of emerging markets. Counterfactual analysis suggests that official debt is welfare improving and finds the feasibility of voluntary swaps that generate Pareto Improvements by exchanging one type of debt for another one. Our work rationalizes the involvement of official debt in the resolution of sovereign defaults.

This paper explores the macroeconomic implications of tight global financial conditions in a small open economy New Keynesian model with sovereign default. My analysis shows that the interplay between the government incentives to repay the debt and inflation during periods of high world interest rates has distinct implications for monetary policy. I show that a monetary easing may emerge when a world interest rate hike induces a substantial increase in the probability of default, depressing domestic demand and leading firms to reduce inflation. This default amplification channel complements the expenditure-switching and expenditure-reducing channels found in standard open economy models, and rationalizes why emerging economies might reduce monetary policy rates when the Federal Reserve tightens. An increase in sovereign risk reduces aggregate domestic demand beyond these conventional channels, leading a real exchange rate depreciation to be contractionary for output.

Motivated by an unprecedented deviation from fiscal rules observed during the COVID-19 pandemic, we develop a sovereign debt model with strategic enforcement of fiscal rules. Empirically, we document that the presence of fiscal rules is statistically significantly associated with lower sovereign spreads during the COVID-19 crisis. This correlation persists even when nations deviate from the rule, suggesting that financial markets do not penalize deviations from the rule during global crises due to an expectation of post-crisis compliance. To test our hypothesis, we enhance a sovereign debt model with the possibility of deviating from the fiscal rule by imposing an exogenous cost of deviation. We show that, if there is no deviation cost during a global crisis, the model can rationalize quantitatively the sovereign spread compressing effect of fiscal rules. Overall, the findings suggest that fiscal rules can help emerging markets and developing economies signal fiscal responsibility during episodes of global financial stress, reducing borrowing costs relative to countries without fiscal rules.

This paper explores the relationship between the currency composition and bondholder composition of sovereign debt, focusing on the government’s incentives to issue debt denominated in local currency (LC) or foreign currency (FC). We introduce a framework that analyzes the trade-offs that governments face when domestic and foreign demand for bonds react differently to policy changes. The main result is that the government considers the effect on bondholder composition when choosing the currency of its debt. Domestic investors’ demand for LC bonds is higher due to the insurance provided against distortionary taxes.

This paper develops a regime-switching New Keynesian model for a small open economy, with an occasionally binding financial friction that allows for endogenous financial crises. The model has two regimes: a regime for normal economic times, in which financial market access is unconstrained, and a crisis regime, characterized by curtailed access to foreign borrowing. The transition probability between regimes depends on the endogenous variables of the model. We employ this framework to analyze the macroeconomic implications of adapting the Inflation Targeting (IT) strategy in a way that takes into account the possibility to prevent the occurrence of financial crises. We calibrate the model using Colombian historical data. The results show that monetary policy has major limitations when it seeks to prevent financial crises. As the central bank gives more importance to the GDP growth gap, the frequency with which crises occur decreases. However, this reduction is quantitatively small. On the other hand, as the monetary authority responds more strongly to increases in the external debt growth rate, the frequency with which the economy goes into crisis is not significantly different from the current IT scheme. However, the volatilities of inflation and consumption are much higher.